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This paper studies how IMF lending affects countries' bonds maturity. Debt maturity was 
claimed to be one of the causes of the crisis of recent years: Too much short-term debt 
would be the seed of self-fulfilling crises. In turn, one of the goals of the IMF is to prevent 
crises and to alleviate their effects once they occur. I find that IMF interventions shorten the 
length of countries' borrowing which is a non desirable, and not analyzed, consequence of 
IMF lending. Moreover, this finding is consistent with the implications of this Institution's 






En este trabajo se estudia si las intervenciones del Fondo Monetario Internacional acortan 
el plazo de vencimiento de la deuda de un país. La excesiva cantidad de deuda de corto 
plazo que se emite en un país ha sido señalada como una de las principales causas de la 
ocurrencia de crisis soberanas. La emisión excesiva de deuda de corto plazo puede gatillar 
la ocurrencia de corridas contra la misma. A su vez, uno de los principales objetivos del 
FMI es impedir la ocurrencia de crisis y, si estas ocurren, colaborar para que su resolución 
sea lo menos traumática posible. Este trabajo encuentra que las intervenciones del FMI 
acortan el plazo de vencimiento de la deuda, lo que representaría un efecto no deseado—y 
no estudiado—de las mismas. Además, el rol de “acreedor preferido” que tiene esta 
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From time to time economies are hit by ﬁnancial crises. In turn, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF or Fund) has become the most important International Financial Institution lending
money and assisting these economies to cope with such crises. Through its interventions, the Fund
is likely to aﬀect countries’ capital market access and ﬁnancial structure, which may aﬀect their
vulnerability to crisis (see, for example, Boz (2011) and Mody and Saravia (2006)).
In particular, this paper studies whether the International Monetary Fund’s interventions aﬀect
countries’ borrowing term structure. The issuance of too much short-term debt, either by the
government or by the public sector, was recognized as one of the problems that has been present in
the International Financial Architecture and one of the usual suspects leading to ﬁnancial crises,
for example Mexico (1994) and Asia (1998) (e.g. Rodrik and Velasco (1999) and Detragiache
and Spilimbergo (2004)). As recently as 2010, European countries faced ﬁscal problems that have
translated into debt-rollover diﬃculties.1 Although, in these cases, the crisis may not have been
clearly originated in excessive short-term borrowing, it has undermined investor conﬁdence and has
made diﬃcult to ﬁnd fresh funds to repay debt.
The Fund, through its interventions, pursues the stability of the international monetary system
and, consequently, one of its goals is to take actions to prevent crises and act expeditiously once
they occur. Understanding whether IMF lending aﬀects the maturity of countries’ borrowing is a
relevant issue and one that has not been studied before, to the best of my knowledge.
Suppose that IMF lending shortens the length of countries’ borrowing. Then, this would actually
be a negative consequence of its interventions if one of the possible causes of crises is the holding
of too much short-term debt. On the other hand, if Fund lending allows countries to tap longer
maturities it would be helping countries to reach a more convenient ﬁnancial proﬁle, reducing the
probability of a ﬁnancial crisis.
As will be discussed below there are forces related to the Fund’s lending that prevent us from
making an unambiguous conclusion ex-ante on this question. On the one hand, IMF interventions
could improve countries’ economic prospects and alleviate a situation of distress by allowing coun-
tries to borrow at longer terms. This is the case because countries ﬁnd it diﬃcult to borrow at
longer terms in diﬃcult situations (e.g. Broner et al (2010)). On the other hand, if IMF interven-
1See for example The Economist on February 4 2010.
1tion is not perceived as signiﬁcantly improving the economic situation, and considering that the
Fund is a de-facto senior lender, other lenders would prefer to lend short-term since it increases
the probability that they will be repayed. Having shorter maturities than the senior lender is safer.
Some authors have highlighted the issue of IMF seniority (e.g. Bi (2006) and Saravia (2010))
and recently some commentators have argued that seniority implicit in European countries’ rescue
packages was an important factor behind the failure to reduce spreads after the Greek and Irish
packages, (see, for example, Gros (2010))
These trade-oﬀs have opposite empirical implications and presenting this evidence is the prin-
cipal goal of this paper.
There are some identiﬁcation concerns that need to be tackled. Usually, the Fund lends money
to countries that need it because they are already in some kind of distress, and it is diﬃcult for these
countries to borrow long-term during those periods. Thus, care has to be taken in not attributing
to the Fund an eﬀect that is actually a consequence of a crisis.
To face this potential problem, I instrument for IMF interventions as will be discussed below.
As expected, the presence of crisis and vulnerabilities in a country shortens bond maturity, as does
the presence of the Fund. However, the evidence suggests that there is an eﬀect of IMF loans
on maturity over and above what can be attributed to a crisis. Speciﬁcally, Fund interventions
shorten countries’ debt maturity and this eﬀect is stronger if we consider not only the presence of
the Fund but also the size of its interventions; that is, the bigger the interventions, the shorter the
maturity. This evidence is consistent with markets perceiving the Fund as a senior lender but it is
also consistent with lenders perceiving the presence of the Fund as signalling deep-rooted problems
diﬃcult to overcome.
The paper also contributes to the understanding of the determinants of bonds’ maturity derived,
mainly, in the corporate ﬁnance literature discussed below. For example, countries with better
solvency and liquidity indicators, with higher growth rates and higher level of development are able
to borrow at longer terms
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents theoretical considerations that
give a context for the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the discussion of identiﬁcation issues
and a review of previous literature related to the instruments chosen. Section 4 describes the data
and presents descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the results of the regressions concerning the
2control variables, section 6 and section 7 presents the results concerned with IMF interventions and
section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
This section describes some theoretical works in the literature to provide a framework to the
discussion in this paper. Since the goal of this work is to study empirically how IMF interventions
aﬀect debt maturity, I organize the discussion in three steps. First, I will discuss the relationship
between short-term debt and countries’ vulnerability to crises, then I discuss some of the reasons
given for the existence of short-term borrowing despite the liquidity risk it implies and, lastly, I
discuss how IMF interventions may aﬀect debt maturity.
Issuing short-term debt creates liquidity risk derived from the mismatch between this short-
term debt and the assets that can be used to repay it. For example, Chang and Velasco (2001)
present a model in the vein of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) where the presence of short-term debt
may exacerbate the existence of self-fulﬁlling crises; if many short-term debtors believe that there
will not be rollover of this debt then there would be no reﬁnancing and, consequently, a crisis
would occur. Rodrik and Velasco (1999) also present a model where short-term debt can leave the
borrowing country exposed to shifts in lenders’ expectations.
Broner et al (2010) link the existence of crises to the issuance of short-term debt, highlighting
the role of the credit supply. In their model issuing long-term debt is costly because new information
arrives in the short-run, after initial lending decisions have been made. Consequently, long-term
risk-averse lenders charge a term premium for not being able to incorporate this new information
into their contracts, facing a higher degree of uncertainty. The model also shows that this term
premia increases during crises, which increases the issuance of short-term relative to long-term
debt. This ﬁnding is backed by empirical evidence in that paper: during crises short-term debt is
issued and countries wait for tranquil times to issue long-term debt. Thus, causality from crisis to
short-term debt is established as a possibility.
Despite the existence of the costs associated with short-term debt there are reasons why short-
term borrowing would be desirable. Some of these reasons have been explored in the sovereign
debt literature. Calvo (1988) and Blanchard and Missale (1994) focus on government incentives
3to liquate debts using inﬂation. Issuing short-term debt would be one instrument to ameliorate
this incentive. Rodrick and Velasco (1999) and Jeanne (2009) argue that short-term debt acts as a
commitment device. When short-term debt is issued, governments have less ex-post incentives to
default, which increases welfare.
The corporate ﬁnance literature pointed also to other reasons to issue short-term debt that may
also be relevant in the present context. Diamond (1991), in a model of asymmetric information,
argues that debtors with higher credit ratings would prefer to issue short-term rather than long-
term debt because it allows them to take advantage of the information revealed in the near future
by reﬁnancing at better contractual terms. The cost of issuing short-term debt is that would imply
liquidation of the project in cases that it would not be socially desirable. Another reason given in
this literature to explain short-term lending is that it allows for closer monitoring of debtors and for
the modiﬁcation of the contractual relationship in case that it is necessary to do so (see Diamond
(1991), Diamond (1993) and Rajan (1992)).
I will turn next to the discussion of how IMF interventions would aﬀect debt maturity, and
through this channel, the probability of crisis occurrence.
The IMF may aﬀect debt maturity through several channels. The Fund has an informational
role trough its role of monitor. Marchesi and Thomas (1999) argue that countries borrowing from
the Fund signal to international markets their willingness or ability to undertake policies necessary
for enhancing the probability of future debt repayment. The IMF, Tirole (2002, p. 99) argues,
can act as a delegated monitor to “substitute for the missing contracts between the sovereign and
individual foreign investors and to thereby help the host country to fully beneﬁt from its capital
account liberalization.” He notes that missing contracts are not just a problem when foreigners lend
to the sovereign. The problem is serious even when the lending is to private domestic borrowers.
The ability of private borrowers to repay is a function of a variety of unpredictable government
actions, which can de facto expropriate foreign lenders.
Thus, if the role of the IMF as monitor is credible, its presence would reduce lenders’ necessity
of monitoring through short-term lending, as the works discussed above suggest. Also, in this case,
the reduction of the uncertainty that lenders face would reduce the term-premium discussed in
Broner et al (2010) allowing countries to tap longer maturities.
However, if a Fund intervention is not perceived as improving a country’s economic situation or
4it is perceived as signalling a diﬃcult situation and its role as monitor is not perceived as eﬀective,
its presence would reduce borrowing maturity.
Moreover, it is commonly recognized that the IMF is a de facto preferred (senior) creditor.
Countries have shown a higher aversion to default on IMF loans than on loans from private creditors;
using Eichengreen’s (2003) words: “The IMF typically gets paid back (instances of arrears to IMF
loans are the exception to the rule).”2 This seniority implicit in IMF lending would have the
opposite implications on debt maturity.
Bi (2006) presents a model of sovereign borrowing with risk-averse borrowers where a senior
intervention increases the risk of dilution, increasing the incentives to issue short-term debt.
We can also draw conclusions on senior lending and debt maturity from a framework similar to
Broner et al (2010) discussed above. Although they only consider the case where non-senior lending
is made to cope with a liquidity distress, it is possible to infer that if this lending were allowed to
be senior, then borrowers would issue only short-term debt. This is the case because senior lending
would be always available to cope with the liquidity squeeze if there were investment and borrowing
in the ﬁrst place. Thus, short-term lenders would be repaid by this new senior lending. This would
occur even if uncertainty is not reduced by the IMF’s presence.
In the corporate ﬁnance literature, Diamond (1993) also argues that allowing for senior future
borrowing makes it easier to issue short-term debt in the present since it will be repaid with future
senior lending. Allowing senior debt makes liquidation less likely ( and reﬁnancing more likely) and
this would be an equilibrium in some cases.
Summarizing, this section presents some of the reasons for the existence of short-term debt
and why it may be a cause of the crises that countries recurrently face. It also discusses a reverse
causality, that is, why countries are more likely to issue short-term debt during a crisis. From
the above discussion it can also be inferred that there are considerations about IMF lending that
lead to opposite empirical implications. On the one hand, IMF lending can help countries to
overcome a diﬃcult situation, allowing them to issue long-term debt. On the other hand, if the
IMF is not perceived as an eﬀective monitor, and if its presence did not signal an improvement in
countries’ economic situation, it would not help countries to reach longer maturities. In addition,
IMF seniority would obstruct long-term lending since it jeopardizes what other non-senior lenders
2See Saravia (2010) and references therein for a discussion of this topic.
5expect to recover.
3 Identiﬁcation Issues
In the analysis of the way that IMF programs aﬀect countries’ debt maturity, it is necessary to be
careful with identiﬁcation issues that may be present. This is the case because countries that are
likely to have an IMF program are also countries facing some kind of distress or vulnerability, such
as, a ﬁnancial crisis. Both IMF programs and crisis–and/or vulnerabilities– are likely to aﬀect debt
maturity, as discussed in section 2. Thus, it is possible to assign to the IMF an eﬀect on maturity
that is actually a consequence of another phenomena such as a crisis.
The approach I take in the paper to make this problem less likely to occur is to instrument
for IMF programs. To choose the instruments I follow previous works, discussed in subsection
3.1, on the determinants of IMF lending. The variables used as instruments proved adequate at
detecting the presence of the Fund, and they are not likely to be contemporaneously correlated
with countries’ distress.
The instruments used in this paper refer to the governance of the Fund and to internal and
external political factors. As a measure of IMF governance I use a country’s share of total quota
subscriptions, which determines the voting power of each country in the Fund. Each country
member subscribes a quota to the Fund that gives voting rights. Not all country members have
the same voting rights. As explained in the IMF’s website: “Quota subscriptions generate most of
the IMF’s ﬁnancial resources. Each member country of the IMF is assigned a quota, based broadly
on its relative size in the world economy. A member’s quota determines its maximum ﬁnancial
commitment to the IMF and its voting power, and has a bearing on its access to IMF ﬁnancing.”
(http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/quotas.htm).
As measures of political factors, I include an index of democracy in each country and the
country’s aﬃnity with the US as measured by its aﬃnity in United Nations voting records.
Consistent with some previous works, I ﬁnd that countries with higher quotas and those with
higher aﬃnity with the US are more likely to be involved in a Fund program. Also, the probability
of having a program increases with countries’ index of democracy.
63.1 Literature Review on the Choice of Instruments.
This subsection discusses brieﬂy some works in the empirical literature that use political variables
as determinants of IMF lending and that give support to the instruments chosen in this paper.
Edwards and Santaella (1993) argue that crisis severity and political factors are important
determinants of IMF lending. As political variables they use an indicator variable of democracy, an
index of political stability and ideology of the government. They claim that democratic countries
are less likely to have an IMF program. The reason is that a less democratic country would have
fewer problems taking unpopular policies and, consequently, the Fund’s presence would be less
necessary. They ﬁnd weak evidence that dictatorial regimes and coup frequency are positively
associated with Fund’s presence.
In this vein, Bird and Rowlands (2001) ﬁnd that socialist countries have less chances of having an
IMF program and that worsening civil liberties appears to be positively associated with a program.
On the other hand, Vreeland (2005) argues that it is likely that countries with a political system
with more veto powers are more likely to have a program. The intuition is that if the IMF is used
as an instrument to introduce some unpopular reforms, the executive has higher incentives to have
a Fund program the more veto power the political system has.
Thacker (2000) concludes that political proximity to the US is important to explain the Fund’s
presence in a country. He measures political proximity with voting patterns in the UN assembly.
Vreeland (2005) also tests for political proximity using UN votes. He ﬁnds that moving closer to
the US in this aspect increases the probability of having a program. Barro and Lee (2005) also
use political variables and variables that refer to the country-Fund relationship as instruments for
IMF lending. They ﬁnd that the higher is a country’s quota share in the Fund, the higher the
probability of it having a program. They also ﬁnd that political aﬃnity with the US and Europe
increases the probability of having a program. Eichengreen, Mody and Gupta (2006) also analyze
the determinants of IMF programs in a paper analyzing the interaction between these programs
and sudden stops. As political indicators they also use UN voting and US foreign aid. Mody and
Saravia (2009) study the determinants of the time elapsed between a crisis and a program. They
ﬁnd that this period of time is inversely related to countries’ quota and there is evidence of the
importance of political proximity with the US and the level of countries’ democracy.
Summarizing, the instruments used in this paper have been used in previous empirical works
7explaining or instrumenting IMF involvement in a country and the eﬀects we ﬁnd in this paper are
similar to those in the literature.
4 Data and Descriptive Statisitcs
I seek to explain if the maturity of an emerging market bond is inﬂuenced by the presence of an
IMF program. To study this I rely on data of about 3300 bonds issued by emerging countries in
the period 1991 through 2001.3
The bonds included in this paper are of one-year or greater maturity. The average maturity
of bonds in the sample is around six years. Bond markets have more of an arm’s-length nature
compared to bank lending where creditors and lenders often have longer-term relationships and
where banks are able to undertake monitoring themselves at a level not possible for dispersed
bondholders. This is an important aspect to consider in studying the eﬀects of IMF interventions
since the Fund could have a role as a “delegated monitor” in these markets, as discussed above.
The dependent variable used in the regression is the maturity of these bonds measured in years.
To choose the control variables I follow closely the literature on determinants of bond spreads,
principally Eichengreen and Mody (2004) and Mody and Saravia (2006), and the literature on the
determinants of debt maturity whose contributions are mainly in the corporate ﬁnance literature.4
The data sources for the dependent and explanatory variables are documented in Appendix
A. Details on bonds issued and their characteristics are obtained from Bondware, a commercial
data source. Bond characteristics included in the regressions are: the dollar value of the bond
issued, whether the issuer was in the public or private sectors, the industrial sector of the issuer,
the currency of issue, and whether the bond had a ﬁxed or ﬂoating rate. The global variables
included are: U.S. industrial growth rate during the quarter in which the bond was issued; the
daily swap rate (as a measure of liquidity risk); and, as a measure of market uncertainty, the
standard deviation of daily Emerging Market Bond Index (a commonly followed index of emerging
market spreads) over the relevant quarter. I use several country characteristics as control variables.
Country credit ratings provided by Institutional Investor are a measure of country wealth (being
3The data I had access to has no information on more recent bonds’ issuances. However, the period analyzed is
one where severe crisis occur and where the IMF has intervened.
4I do not have information on balance sheets in the database which is used as part of the explanatory variables in
some works in the corporate ﬁnance literature.
8highly correlated with per capita income and wealth) and, more generally, an index of the likelihood
of debt repayment. As measures of country solvency and liquidity, I include: external debt relative
to GNP, a dummy variable for whether the sovereign has restructured debt within the previous
year, the growth rate of real GDP, the variance of export growth, the ratio of short-term debt
to total debt, the ratio of reserves to imports, and the ratio of domestic private credit to GDP.
Note that the debt-restructuring variable used is not the same as debt rescheduling: restructuring
reﬂects a positive eﬀort at debt management and typically involves exchanging new debt for old,
more expensive, or inﬂexible debt. The IMF variables used are an IMF program dummy taking
the value of one in the month that a program begins until it ﬁnishes and the size of the program
relative to the country’s external debt.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
In the period analyzed, over 250 IMF programs were negotiated, with the number of programs
varying between 20 and 35 per year, except in 1990 and 2000 when there were less than 20 programs.
There is no trend in either the number of programs or the amount of ﬁnancial support committed
by the Fund. In particular, ﬁnancial support has been large at times of crisis: the big jump in
1995 reﬂects the large package to Mexico and the large commitments in 1997 and 1998 following
the East Asian and Russian crises.
Table 1 and 2 show how the maturity of the bonds issued is related to the period of crisis indi-
cators and other indicators of countries’ fundamentals, while table 3 compares bond characteristics
and some countries’ indicators in periods when there is a Fund program with periods when there
is no such programs.
Table 1 shows that bonds’ average maturity is shorter when a country is facing a crisis such as a
sudden stop, a banking crisis, a balance of payment crisis or an attack on the currency, while table
2 shows the correlation between maturity and countries’ solvency and liquidity indicators such as
the ratio of reserves to imports, GDP growth and the ratio of the banking sector’s short-term debt
to total debt.5 It can be seen that the more vulnerable is a country’s situation, as measured by
these indicators, the shorter is the maturity of the bonds issued. The exception is the indicator of
total debt over GDP where a higher ratio is related to a higher maturity.
5This ratio refers to the stock of debt while the dependent variable of the regression is maturity of an individual
bond issued.
9Maturity of bonds issued is shorter in countries, and periods, where the Fund is present and
this presence is related to countries’ vulnerability, as shown in table 3. In countries where the IMF
is present there is a higher ratio of debt to GDP, a lower growth rate, and a higher volatility of
exports. However, the ratio of reserves to imports is positively related to Fund presence.6
The signs of the relation among maturity, crisis (or vulnerability) indicators and IMF programs
are, generally, as expected from the discussion of the theoretical background in section 2. Countries
in crisis or with worse fundamentals rely more on shorter maturities and are also more likely to
have an IMF program, consistent with previous literature.
Of course, these correlations do not imply causality in any way but give a sense of the possible
relation between crisis, vulnerability and maturity that, as discussed above, may imply an identi-
ﬁcation problem in the study of the eﬀects of the IMF. In the next section I turn to a description
of the empirical ﬁndings of the paper.
5 Base Regression Results
Before turning to the discussion of the eﬀects of IMF interventions on bond maturity, this section
discusses the most relevant variables used as control, presented in table 4 and table 6.
Although the main results are discussed using these tables as framework, later in section 7, I
present results using an estimation method that controls also for sample selection bias which may
be relevant in our case given the structure of the data. Results derived under both methods are
similar and I present both to reinforce the ﬁndings of the paper.
Countries with better solvency and liquidity situation are able to borrow at longer maturities
as can be inferred from the sign of the variables referring to the ratio of debt service to exports, the
ratio of short-term debt to total debt and the ratio of reserves to imports.7 Also, countries with
better credit ratings and higher growth rates have longer maturities.
As a proxy for the level of development and quality of institutions I use, as some works discussed
below do, the stock of bank credit and the level of GDP per capita for the year 1990 which is when
the data begins. Both variables have a positive sign meaning that more developed countries are
able to obtain longer maturities.
6This could be the consequence of imputing the amount of the program in countries’ reserves.
7The one exception being the ratio of total debt to GNP which has a positive sign.
10Countries that were recently involved in a debt rescheduling also have longer maturities in their
bond issuance, which is the expected eﬀect since the natural consequence of a debt rescheduling is
to extend the maturity of countries’ debt.
The negative sign of the sudden stop and banking crisis indicators suggests that countries facing
a ﬁnancial crisis borrow at shorter terms or cannot tap longer maturities.8
The variable that indicates the presence of the Fund is also negatively correlated with maturity.
As discussed, this eﬀect may be capturing an eﬀect that should actually be attributed to other
factors and it is what motivates the use of instrumental variables in the next section.
In a nutshell, the evidence described above shows that countries with better solvency and
liquidity situations, higher levels of development, higher growth rates and absence of a current
crisis– i.e. with better internal fundamentals– are those that obtain longer maturities in their
borrowing. As noted in section 2, the direction of causation between vulnerability indicators and
maturity is not clear; some argue that countries cannot borrow short-term in distress (Broner et al
(2010)) and others argue that that short-term debt is itself a cause of crisis.
However, in our case, the problem of identifying the direction of causation may be less prob-
lematic. This would be the case since the dependent variable is the maturity of a particular bond
rather than the stock of short-term debt. The maturity of a particular bond issuance is not likely to
contemporaneously cause a crisis or make the country more vulnerable since it refers to a particular
bond rather than an aggregate variable. The problem of reverse causation would be more serious
when using aggregate variables such as, the stock of debt or the growth rate, as the dependent
variable. 9
The control variables used to capture external volatility– i.e. the EMBI volatility and export
growth volatility– have a positive eﬀect on maturity.
We can relate these ﬁndings to the empirical literature in corporate ﬁnance. Some works in
this ﬁeld have used country characteristics as explanatory variables to explain ﬁrms’ debt maturity
and found systematic diﬀerences in the use of long-term debt between developed and developing
countries. In developed countries, with better institutions, there is a higher proportion of long-
term debt (see, for example Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) and Deesomsak et al (2009)).
8Although the second variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
9This reasoning is similar to the one used by Eichengreen and Mody (2004) and Mody and Saravia (2006) when
studying bonds’ spreads.
11This ﬁnding is consistent with Diamond (1991), Diamond (1993) and Rajan (1992) that argue that
short-term borrowing makes it more diﬃcult for borrowers to defraud creditors and thus, countries
with worse institutions are likely to ﬁnd short-term borrowing.
As discussed in Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) the eﬀect of the size of the banking
sector is an empirical matter. On the one hand, a more developed banking sector creates incentives
to rely on short-term lending since this form of ﬁnancing enables banks to use their comparative
advantage in monitoring. However, banks’ economies of scale also allow them to oﬀer longer term
contracts. As mentioned above, I do ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on maturity. However, it is not possible to
identify whether this is due to the reason given here, or because it is a proxy of better institutions.10
6 Eﬀects of IMF interventions on bonds maturity
We turn next to the analysis of the eﬀects of IMF interventions on a country bonds’ maturity. As
discussed, countries in distress are more likely to have shorter debt maturity. However, the IMF
would be able to enable them to obtain longer maturities if it were able to help them overcome their
diﬃcult situation through its lending and/or its role as a credible monitor. The lack of credibility in
this role and the senior status of the IMF tend to reduce maturity. Consequently, it is an empirical
matter to see which eﬀect dominates.
In table 4, I begin exploring how IMF interventions aﬀect bond maturity. Column 1 presents the
estimation results using the dummy variable indicating the presence of the Fund directly without
instrumenting for it. As can be seen there is a negative relationship between IMF programs and
bond maturity. The coeﬃcient indicates that, on average, the presence of IMF lending is associated
with a reduction in maturity of almost one year which is an economically relevant magnitude since
it is almost 17 percentage points of bond average maturity.
As can be seen in the regression results the variables that indicate the presence of a sudden
stop and a banking crisis have a negative sign although only the ﬁrst one is statistically diﬀerent
from zero.
As noted above, there is a relationship between crisis and maturity and also between IMF
programs and crisis; thus it may be the case that we are attributing to the IMF an eﬀect on
10Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) ﬁnd evidence that this variable is also related to other variables measuring
institutional quality and level of development.
12maturity that is really an eﬀect that should be attributed to crisis. To address this problem I
instrument IMF participation as discussed above.
Table 5 presents the results of the Two Stage Least Squares estimation. Column 1 reports the
ﬁrst stage results only for the instruments and the variables related to crisis. The other control
variables were, of course, used in the ﬁrst stage, but they are not reported for the sake of exposition.
The sign of the instruments’ coeﬃcients are as expected.11 Countries with a higher quota share,
with a higher democracy index and more closely related to the US are more likely to have an IMF
program. These results are consistent with previous ﬁndings (see Barro 2005, Thaker 2000 and
Mody and Saravia 2009).
The second stage is presented in column 2. As can be seen, the eﬀect of an IMF intervention
more than doubles the eﬀect found previously without instrumenting. Also, note that none of the
crisis variables used have any eﬀect when instruments are used.
Thus, the evidence suggests that IMF lending by itself reduces the maturity of bonds issued
in an economically relevant magnitude considering that bonds’ maturity mean is six years in the
sample.
Next, I study the eﬀects of the size of the IMF loan on maturity. This amount is likely to
aﬀect the maturity through similar channels as the ones described above. Bigger programs may
be indicative of bigger problems but they could also reﬂect the level of the Fund’s commitment
to the country. If these bigger programs are perceived as incrementing the probability that the
country will overcome the crisis and go back to its normal state, then it is likely that they would
allow countries to borrow at longer terms. However, the analysis of seniority could also be applied
here. Bigger programs may be perceived as jeopardizing what non-senior lenders would get after
the senior lender is paid back; this is more likely if programs are not perceived as able to make the
country signiﬁcantly improve its economic prospects.
As before, I ﬁrst present the eﬀects of the amount of the programs– as a share of total debt–
without using any instruments. As shown in table 6, the larger is the loan (as a share of debt) the
lower is the maturity of bonds. However, this speciﬁcation may suﬀer from the same bias as the
IMF program dummy, so I instrument the amount using the same set of instruments used in the
11Sargan-Hansen overidentiﬁcation test does not allow to reject the null hypothesis that instruments are valid ones
as shown in table 5.
13previous exercise. Table 7 presents the results of the Two Stage Least Squares estimation.12
As before, looking at the ﬁrst stage regression, the closeness of the country with the US and
the higher is its quota in the Fund, the larger is the amount that they can borrow from the
IMF; however the democracy variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in this case, although
it conserves the sign. The second stage is presented in column 2. When instrumenting for the
amount of the loan, the eﬀect on maturity is bigger than in the case where the dummy variable
is used. The coeﬃcient obtained indicates that for each percentage point increase in this ratio,
maturity shortens by around 3 months. Thus an increase equivalent to one standard deviation in
this ratio, which is 3.6 percentage points, reduces maturity by around eleven months.
Summarizing the results of this section, the presence of the IMF in a country seems to reduce
the length of its borrowing and this is true even after considering the possibility that the Fund’s
presence is actually capturing the more general eﬀects of a crisis. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the story of seniority of the IMF over other kinds of lenders.
7 Selection Bias
Since the maturity of a bond will be observed only when the decision to borrow and lend is made
there is a sample selection problem that may be biasing our results.
To deal with this potential sample selection bias I closely follow previous works in the literature
on bonds’ spread determinants (see, for example, Mody and Saravia (2006)) and use a sample
selection model a la Heckman (1979).
In this paper, however, I also have to deal with the identiﬁcation problems related to the
presence of IMF programs discussed in previous sections .
The ﬁrst equation in the sample selection model is the one explaining bonds’ maturity:
Maturity = βX + μ1. (1)
As before, X is a vector of issue, issuer, and period characteristics; and μ1 is a random error.
The second equation of the sample selection model (selection equation) consists of a probit
12As in the case of instrumenting for IMF presence, Sargan-Hansen test does not allow to reject the null hypotheses
that the instruments are well behaved.
14estimate of the probability of issuing a bond. I assume that maturities are observed when a latent
variable B crosses a threshold B  deﬁned by:
B  = γZ + μ2, (2)
where Z is the vector of variables that determines the desire of borrowers to borrow and the
willingness of lenders to lend (including the IMF program variable).
It is further assumed that:
μ1 ∼ N(0,σ),μ 2 ∼ N(0,1),corr(μ1,μ 2)=ρ.
Estimating the determinants of market access requires information on those who did not issue
bonds. For each country we consider three categories of issuers: sovereign, (other) public, and
private. For each quarter and country where one of these issuers did not come to the market, I
record a zero, and where they did I record a one.
Leung and Yu (1996) note that the estimation does not require the variables in the selection
equation and the spread equation to be diﬀerent. What is critical instead is to avoid multicollinear-
ity between the variables in the spreads equation and the ”inverse-Mills ratio” constructed from
the selection equation. That, in turn, requires the value of the variables not be concentrated in a
small range and that the truncated observations (no bond issuance) should not dominate the set of
observations. In our case, most variables have a large range and about a third of the observations
have a bond issued.
The estimation of this sample selection model does take care of the sample selection bias but
does not allow us to avoid the bias related to the presence of IMF programs. To face this problem
I follow the same instrumental-variables strategy as in previous sections.
Thus, the whole model estimation consist of two steps. The ﬁrst step consists in estimating
the predicted value of the IMF program variable. This is done as the usual ﬁrst step in the
instrumental variable estimations presented above.13Second, this predicted value is used in the
principal and selection equations in the standard Heckman (1979) model, equations 1 and 2, which
are jointly estimated by maximum likelihood procedures.
13With the caveat that it is not possible to include in the ﬁrst step estimation the variables related to bonds. This
is the case because if a country did not issue a bond, the predicted value for IMF program would be missing. This
prevents estimating the probit in the Heckman model because these missing values would appear in all the cases
where the binary variable in the probit is zero making impossible its estimation.
157.1 Results
In table 8, I present the results for this sample selection model instrumenting for IMF presence. I
do not present the results of the ﬁrst-step regression to predict IMF program for concreteness since
they are comparable to the ones presented before in table 5.
As can be seen in that table, the eﬀects of the control variables obtained in previous estimations
( table 4) are generally maintained when correcting for sample selection. Also, the presence of an
IMF program in a country reduces its length of borrowing which is also similar to results reported
and discussed previously.
In the participation equation, the variable referred to the (instrumented) IMF participation has
a positive sign meaning that countries with a program in place are more likely to issue a bond.
Results referred to control variables in this equation are similar to the ones presented in the previous
works mentioned above and are self explanatory.14
Mody and Saravia (2006) found that an IMF program reduces spreads and increase the proba-
bility of issuing bonds. Relating those results to the ones presented here, it is as if the IMF helped
countries to tap international capital markets at a lower cost. Thus, the eﬀect could be interpreted
as an increase in the supply of funds. However, this increase in the supply of funds is available only
at shorter maturities.
8 Conclusions
This paper is a ﬁrst step in analyzing how IMF lending aﬀects countries’ debt maturity. Under-
standing this is an important– and not studied– issue since it may imply an undesired consequence
of IMF lending: that it creates an incentive to issue short-term debt in countries where this has
been recognized as a cause of recurrent crises.
The paper also presents evidence that countries facing a crisis and countries that are in a more
vulnerable situation issue bonds with a shorter maturity. This is consistent with works showing
that it is diﬃcult for countries to borrow at longer terms during a crisis.
Since IMF lending is more likely to be present in countries that face some kind of crisis and/or
are more vulnerable, there is the risk to attribute to the Fund an eﬀect that is actually coming
14I do not present here the results corresponding to the size of IMF programs but they are comparable to the ones
obtained in the estimations that do not take into account the potential sample selection bias.
16from a country’s pre-existing distress. To address this problem, I instrument IMF lending using
political and variables related to IMF governance that proved useful predicting Fund interventions
and are not likely to be contemporaneously related to countries’ distress.
The evidence in this respect shows that IMF lending shortens the term structure of countries’
borrowing over and above the eﬀect that can be attributed to a crisis or a country’s vulnerable
situation. This conclusion is supported both when using a dummy variable indicating a program
and when the size of the program is taken into account. It is also supported when using methods
to take into account a potential sample selection bias that would be present given the nature of the
data used.
As has been discussed in the theoretical literature, this ﬁnding is consistent with the fact that
the fund is a senior lender and/or its presence in a country signals deep-rooted problems that would
not be able to overcome.
17Table 1: Maturity and Crisis
Maturity Mean Maturity Mean
All 6.3 6.3
IMF program 5.2 No IMF Program 6.7
Sudden Stop 6.1 No Sudden Stop 6.3
Banking Crisis 6 No Banking Crisis 6.4
Succesful attacks 4.1 No succesful Attack 6.3




Annual GDP growth 0.04
Short-Term Debt/Total Debt -0.011
Total Debt/GDP 0.028
Table 3: IMF Programs, Bond Issuance, and Country Characteristics
No Fund
Program Program Total
Number of bonds 2156 1139 3295
Maturity (years) 6.67 5.44 6.25
Amount ($ millions) 154 177 162
Debt/GDP 0.27 0.43 0.32
Annual GDP growth (percent) 5.04 3.29 4.4
Volatility of Exports 0.08 0.11 0.09
Reserves/imports (months of imports) 5.91 6.78 6.21
18Table 4: Determinants of Maturity of bonds
Dependent Variable: Maturity
Independent Variable Coeﬃcient Independent Variable Coeﬃcient
IMF Program in place -0.984*** Public Bond - Services 0.978
(0.239) (0.850)
Log(Amount Issued) 0.575*** Public Bond - Utilities 1.845***
(0.162) (0.642)
Growth rate of US IP -8.456 Private Bond -0.480
(35.511) (0.703)
Log(Daily USSP10 Index) -1.263*** Private Bond - Finance -1.373***
(0.354) (0.481)
S.D of daily log change 26.711* Private Bond - Services -1.003*
in EMBI (14.299) (0.520)
Credit Rating 0.095*** Private Bond - Utilities 0.170
(0.016) (0.569)
Total external debt/GNP 2.560*** Latinamerican Country -0.097
(0.910) (0.524)
Debt Management in the 1.911*** Yen denominated -2.393***
past 4 quarters (0.636) (0.404)
Growth rate of real GDP 18.859 Mark denominated -0.568
(11.561) (0.487)
Variance of monthly 1.112 Euro denominated -1.132***
export growth (1.423) (0.401)
Total debt/Short term -2.314* Other Currency -0.070
debt (1.259) (0.428)
Reserves/import 0.100 Fixed 2.796***
(0.107) (0.326)
Bank Credit Stock 0.009 Total debt service/Exports -2.908***
(0.007) (1.014)
Public Bond -1.712*** Sudden Stop in place -0.934*
(0.484) (0.481)






Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
19Table 5: Two Stages Least Squares: Instrumenting for IMF presence.
Step First Second
IMF Program in place (LHS var) -2.270***
(0.765)
IMF Quota Share 0.402***
(0.028)




Sudden Stop in place 0.105** 0.286
(0.048) (0.622)








Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
20Table 6: Determinants of Maturity of bonds
Dependent Variable: Maturity
Independent Variable Coeﬃcient Independent Variable Coeﬃcient
Size of IMF Program/Debt -13.101*** Public Bond - Services 0.698
(1.888) (0.818)
Log(Amount Issued) 0.596*** Public Bond - Utilities 1.682***
(0.162) (0.640)
Growth rate of US IP -4.000 Private Bond -0.392
(35.305) (0.705)
Log(Daily USSP10 Index) -0.988*** Private Bond - Finance -1.383***
(0.356) (0.481)
S.D of daily log change 25.939* Private Bond - Services -1.044*
in EMBI (14.412) (0.519)
Credit Rating 0.095*** Private Bond - Utilities 0.144
(0.016) (0.565)
Total external debt/GNP 2.418*** Latinamerican Bond -0.197
(0.924) (0.519)
Debt Management in the 1.831*** Yen denominated -2.364***
past 4 quarters (0.633) (0.403)
Growth rate of real GDP 21.604* Mark denominated -0.557
(11.567) (0.487)
Variance of monthly 0.305 Euro denominated -1.160***
export growth (1.411) (0.404)
Total debt/Short term -2.398* Other currency -0.164
debt (1.259) (0.245)
Reserves/import 0.115 Fixed 2.740***
(0.107) (0.323)
Bank credit stock 0.008 Total debt service/Exports -3.170***
(0.006) (0.972)
Public Bond -1.485*** Sudden Stop in place -1.092**
(0.485) (0.483)






Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
21Table 7: Two Stages Least Squares: Instrumenting for IMF’s Loan Size.
Step First Second
Size of IMF Program/Debt (LHS var) -25.803**
(10.135)
IMF Quota Share 0.042***
(0.004)




Sudden Stop in place 0.010** 0.353
(0.004) (0.606)








Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
22Table 8: Sample Selection and Instrumenting IMF program
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Maturity Participation
IMF Program (instrumented) -2.865*** 3.283***
(1.044) (0.158)
Growth rate of US IP 44.746 57.651***
(38.248) (7.509)
Log(Daily USSP10 Index) -1.373*** -0.633***
(0.395) (0.056)
S.D of daily log change in EMBI 38.310** -15.587***
(17.675) (2.102)
Credit Rating 0.095*** 0.058***
(0.027) (0.002)
Total external debt/GNP 2.972** -2.342***
(1.446) (0.110)
Debt Management in the past 4 quarters 1.894*** 0.783***
(0.644) (0.105)
Growth rate of real GDP 17.486 5.770***
(12.984) (1.713)
Variance of monthly export growth 0.832 -1.924***
(1.351) (0.376)




Bank Credit Stock 0.007 -0.002***
(0.007) (0.001)
Total debt service/Exports -2.432** 0.551***
(0.963) (0.109)
Sudden Stop in place 0.110 0.135
(0.620) (0.113)
Banking Crisis in place -0.114 0.548***
(0.283) (0.047)
Public Bond -1.171** -0.206***
(0.534) (0.052)
Private Bond 0.460 0.380***
(0.875) (0.046)
Public Bond - Finance -0.370
(0.496)
Public Bond - Services 0.671
(0.965)




Private Bond - Finance -2.169***
(0.636)
Private Bond - Services -1.382**
(0.702)

















Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Signiﬁcance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
23A DATA SOURCES AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES
Bond characteristics
The bond data set, obtained from Bondware, supplemented by the former Emerging Markets
Division of the International Monetary Fund for the early 1990s, covers the period 1991 to 1999
and includes: (a) launch spreads over risk free rates (in basis points, where one basis point is one-
hundredth of a percentage point) (b) the amount of the issue (millions of US$); (c) the maturity
in years; (d) whether the borrower was a sovereign, other public sector entity, or private debtor;
(e) currency of issue; (f) whether the bond had a ﬁxed or ﬂoating rate; (g) borrower’s industrial
sector: manufacturing, ﬁnancial services, utility or infrastructure, other services, or government
(where government, in this case, refers to subsovereign entities and central banks, which could not
be classiﬁed in the other four industrial sectors).
Global variables
United States industrial production growth rate: average of month-month growth rate over a
quarter.
United States ten-year swap spread.
Emerging Market Bond Index: standard deviation of diﬀerence in log of daily spreads.
Countries included in the sample: Argentina, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kaza-
khstan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pak-
istan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Phillipines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, Slo-
vak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Ukraine, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam.
24Table 9: Country Characteristics
Variable (billions) Periodicity Source Series
Total external debt US$ Annual WEO D
(EDT)
Gross national product US$ Annual WEO NGDPD
(GNP, current prices)
Gross domestic product National Annual WEO NGDP
(GDPNC, current prices)
Gross domestic product National Annual WEO NGDP R
(GDP90, 1990 prices)
Total debt service (TDS) US$ Annual WEO DS
Exports (XGS) US$ Annual WEO BX
Exports (X) US$ Monthly IFS M#c|70 dzf
Reserves (RESIMF) US$ Quarterly IFS q#c 1l dzf
Imports (IMP) US$ Quarterly IFS q#c 71 dzf
Domestic bank credit National Quarterly IFS q#c 32d zf
(CLM PVT)1
Short-term bank debt US$ semi-annual BIS
(BISSHT)2
Total bank debt US$ semi-annual BIS
(BISTOT)3
Credit rating (CRTG) Scale semi-annual Institutional
Investor
Years of education Percentage of the 1990 value Robert
population older than Barro’s
25 years with secondary website5
school complete.
Debt restructuring4 Indicator Annual WDT/GDF
1) Credit to private sector.
2) Cross-border bank claims in all currencies and local claims
in non-local currencies of maturity up to and including one year.
3) Total consolidated cross-border claims in all currencies and
local claims in non-local currencies.
4) Indicator variable, which is equal to 1 if a debt rescheduling
took place in the previous year and zero otherwise.
5) http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html (Educational Attainment data).




Standard deviation of Standard deviation of monthly growth




Short-term debt/total debt BISSHT/BISTOT
Domestic credit/GDP CLM PVT/(GDPNC/4)
Sources: International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) and
International Financial Statistics (IFS);IMF program data from the IMF’s
Executive Board Documents and Staﬀ Estimates;World Bank’s World Debt Tables
(WDT) and Global Development Finance (GDF); Bank of International Settlements’
The Maturity, Sectoral, and Nationality Distribution of International Bank
Lending. Credit ratings were obtained from Institutional Investor’s Country
Credit Ratings. Missing data for some countries was completed using the US
State Department’s Annual Country reports on Economic Policy and Trade
Practices (which are available on the internet from
http:www.state.gov/www/issues/economic/trade reports/).
U.S. industrial production: Federal Reserve Swap rates and EMBI from Bloomberg.
26References
Barro, R. and Lee, J.W., (2005). “IMF programs: Who is chosen and what are the eﬀects?”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1245-1269.
Bi, Ran. 2006. “Debt Dilution and the Maturity Structure of Sovereign Bonds.” Unpublished.
Bird, G., and D. Rowlands (2001) . “IMF Lending: How is it aﬀected by Economic, Political
and Institutional Factors”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 4, 243-270.
Blanchard, O.J. and A. Missale, 1994. “The Debt Burden and Debt Maturity,” American
Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(1), pages 309-19, March.
Boz, E., “Sovereign Default, Private Creditors, and the IFIs,” Journal of International Eco-
nomics, vol. 83/1, pp. 70-82, January 2011.
Broner, F., G. Lorenzoni and S. Schmukler (2010). “Why do Emerging Economies Borrow
Short Term?”. Available at: http://www.crei.cat/people/broner/papers.htmlcontent
Calvo, G. A., (1988). “Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations,” American Eco-
nomic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-61, September.
Chang, R., and A. Velasco (2001), “A Model of Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 116, pages 489-517, May.
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V., (1999). “Institutions, ﬁnancial markets, and ﬁrm debt
maturity.” Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 295-336, December.
Deesomsak, R., Paudyal, K. and Pescetto, G., (2009). “Debt maturity structure and the 1997
Asian ﬁnancial crisis.” Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages
26-42, February.
Detragiache, E., and A., Spilimbergo (2004), “Empirical models of short-term debt and crises:
Do they test the creditor run hypothesis? ” European Economic Review Volume 48, Issue 2, April
2004, Pages 379-389
Diamond, D., (1991). “Debt Maturity Structure and Liquidity Risk.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 709-37, August.
Diamond, D., (1993). “Seniority and maturity of debt contracts.” Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 341-368, June.
Diamond, D.W. and P.H. Dybvig (1983), “Bank Runs, deposit Insurance and Liquidity,” Journal
of Political economy, vol. 91 (3), pages 401-419, June.
27Edwards, S., Santaella, J.A., (1993). “Devaluation controversies in the developing countries:lessons
from the Bretton Woods era.” In: Bordo, M.D., Eichengreen, B. (Eds.), A Retrospective on the
Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, pp. 405-455.
Eichengreen, B., (2003). “Restructuring sovereign debt.” Journal of Economic Perspectives
17(4), 75-98.
Eichengreen, B. and Mody, A., (2004). “Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?”
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(495), pages 247-264, 04.
Eichengreen, B., Mody, A., and P. Gupta, (2006), “Sudden Stops and IMF Programs,” NBER
Working Paper 12235
Gros, D., (2010).“ The seniority conundrum: Bail out countries but bail in private, short term
creditors?” VOX, research Based Analysis, December 5 2010.
Jeanne, O., (2009). “Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture,” American
Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2135-48, December.
Leung, S. F. and Yu, S. (1996). “On the choice between sample selection and two-part models,”
Journal of Econometrics, vol. 72 (1-2) (May), pp. 197-229.
Marchesi, S. and Thomas, J. P. (1999). “IMF conditionality as a screening device”, Economic
Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109 (454), pages 111-125, (March).
Mody, A. and Saravia, D., (2006). ”Catalysing Private Capital Flows: Do IMF Programmes
Work as Commitment Devices?.” Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(513), pages
843-867, 07.
Mody, A. and Saravia, D., (2009). ”From Crisis to IMF-Supported Program: Does Democracy
Impede the Speed Required by Financial Markets?.” Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 513,
Central Bank of Chile. http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/studies/working-papers/513.htm
Rajan, R., (1992). “Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s-Length
Debt.” Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-400, September.
Rodrik, D. and Velasco A., (1999). “Short-Term Capital Flows.” NBER working paper 7364.
Saravia, D., (2010). “On The Role and Eﬀects of IMF Seniority” Journal of International
Money and Finance, 29 (6), 1024-1044.
Thacker, S., (2000). “The high Politics of IMF lending”, World Politics, 52, 38-75.
28Tirole, J. (2002). “Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System”, Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.
Vreeland, J., (2005). “The International and Domestic Politics of IMF Programs,” mimeo.
29 
Documentos de Trabajo 
Banco Central de Chile 
Working Papers 
Central Bank of Chile 
  
NÚMEROS ANTERIORES  PAST ISSUES 
 
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:  
www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc. Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia impresa con un 
costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se pueden hacer por fax: 
(56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from: 
www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered individually for 
US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by fax: (56-2) 6702231 




Is Previous Export Experience Important for New Exports? 
Roberto Álvarez, Hasan Faruq y Ricardo A. López 
Noviembre 2010 
   
DTBC-598 
Accounting for Changes in College Attendance Profile: A 
Quantitative Life-cycle Analysis 
Gonzalo Castex 
Noviembre 2010 
   
DTBC-597 
Fluctuaciones del Tipo de Cambio Real y Transabilidad de Bienes 
en el Comercio Bilateral Chile - Estados Unidos 
Andrés Sagner 
Octubre 2010 
   
DTBC-596 
Distribucion de Probabilidades Implicita en Opciones Financieras 
Luis Ceballos 
Octubre 2010 
   
DTBC-595 
Extracting GDP signals from the monthly indicator of economic 
activity: Evidence from Chilean real-time data 
Michael Pedersen 
Octubre 2010 
   
DTBC-594 
Monetary Policy Under Financial Turbulence: An Overview 
Luis Felipe Céspedes, Roberto Chang y Diego Saravia 
Octubre 2010 
   DTBC-593 




   
DTBC-592 
Evidencia de Variabilidad en el Grado de Persistencia de la 
Política Monetaria para Países con Metas de Inflación 
Benjamín García 
Septiembre 2010 
   
DTBC-591 
Mercados de Financiamiento a los Hogares en el Desarrollo de la 
Crisis Financiera de 2008/2009 
Gabriel Aparici y Fernando Sepúlveda 
Septiembre 2010 
   
DTBC-590 
The Financial Accelerator Under Learning and the Role of 
Monetary Policy 
Rodrigo Caputo, Juan Pablo Medina y Claudio Soto 
Agosto 2010 
   
DTBC-589 
Conventional Calibration Versus EDF Calibration 
Felipe Córdova 
Julio 2010 
   
DTBC-588 
Nowcasting with Google Trends in an Emerging Market 
Yan Carrière-Swallow y Felipe Labbé 
Julio 2010 
   
DTBC-587 
Inflation Targeting in Financially Stable Economies: Has it been 
Flexible Enough? 
Mauricio Calani, Kevin Cowan y Pablo García S. 
Julio 2010 
   
DTBC-586 
Heterodox Central Banking 
Luis Felipe Céspedes, Roberto Chang y Javier García-Cicco 
Junio 2010 
   
DTBC-585 
Recessions and Financial Disruptions in Emerging Markets: A 
Bird’s Eye View 
Stijn Claessens, M. Ayhan Kose y Marco E. Terrones 
Junio 2010 
 